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Similarly, the chapter in its second volume (East Asia: The Great Transformation) introduced the events of the 19 th confrontation with the Western great powers in these terms:
In the nineteenth century, China slipped into the downward phase of a dynastic cycle, that oft-repeated pattern of initial vigor, subsequent stability, slow deterioration, and eventual collapse which had characterized the administrative and political history of most regimes. By 1800, institutions that had functioned with remarkable stability since the Manchu conquest and the establishment of the Ch'ing dynasty in the seventeenth century were seriously degenerating. At the same time the expanding Western powers began to beat upon the gates and demand the opening of the empire to Western diplomatic contact, trade, and evangelism, all of which were subversive to the old Chinese scheme of things. These two domestic and foreign developments went hand in hand, as the nineteenth century advanced, each abetting the other, until by mid-century the dynasty was in dire peril from the ancient twin perils of "internal disorder and external aggression," which had proved the undoing of so many dynasties before.
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In comparable fashion, the text by Fairbank's student Immanuel C.Y. Hsu, The Rise of Modern China, sums up a survey of symptoms of Qing decline at the end of the eighteenth century, as follows:
All of these signs-administrative inefficiency, intellectual irresponsibility, widespread corruption, debasement of the military, pressures of a rising population, and a strained treasury-reflected the inner workings of the phenomenon known as the "dynastic cycle." Indeed, by 1800 the ruling power had passed its peak and started to decline, making the country vulnerable to the the late imperial order was heading toward revolutionary change even before the West "opened" China. 4 Setting the dynastic framework aside makes possible alternative approaches to periodization of China's past according to other criteria that transcend the succession of dynastic regimes. Such an alternative periodization might build on several watershed dates and phases:
• 1600-550 BCE: emergence and decline of the patrimonial soft state;
• 550 BCE-25 CE: the sixth century BCE military revolution and the accompanying state-building transformation;
• 25 CE-755 CE: the rise of a privileged landowning aristocracy and its competition with the claims of centralized empire; the integration of the south;
• 755-1550 CE: the emergence of the commercial transformation and the rise of the examination gentry; and 4 Thus, in a wonderfully provocative chapter in the Cambridge History of China, Susan Mann and Philip Kuhn wrote: "The early nineteenth century is usually viewed backwards, over the historical shoulder of the events of the 1840s and 1850s-the Opium Wars, the Taiping Rebellion. But it is more accurately understood from a perspective that looks ahead, out of the context of developments of the late eighteenth century…Contemporaries frequently explained what was happening in their society in terms of the dichotomy of 'public' (kung) and 'private' (ssu). In their view, the proper realm of public interest, controlled by the government, was shrinking under the encroachment of private interests. These included such obvious groups as the patronage networks, salt smugglers and sub-bureaucratic personnel (clerks and runners), who took the public resources of the state-tax revenues, waterworks projects, grain and salt distribution systems-and transformed them into sources of private profit. Yet the shift from public to private seems to have been more profound than ever these observers realized. Instead of public employment, scholars were now turning to private employment. Instead of using conscripts, the canal system was hiring private laborers. In the place of effete hereditary soldiers, the army rolls were increasingly composed of paid militiamen. Tax collectors purchased their grain from private traders; grain tribute administrators leased boats from private shippers. In other words, commercialization as well as corruption, increasingly social complexity as well as decadence, were among the forces altering Chinese society and the distribution of power within it, on the brink of modern times. As the monarchy lost its capacity to defend its realm against the assertion of private interests, the role of the central government itself in dominating and defining the sphere of public interest was being irreparably damaged." Susan Mann (Jones) and Philip A. Kuhn, "Dynastic Decline and the Roots of Rebellion," Cambridge History of China, Vol.10 Part 1, 160-162.
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• 1550-present: accelerating commercialism and global convergence.
This framework builds on long-term trends in political economy and transformations that, in their way, shaped their respective eras decisively. Such a narrative, of course, may present new problems of its own. But note that none of these dates coincides with those of dynastic change: 550 BCE (later Spring and Autumn period in the Eastern Zhou); 25 CE, the restoration of the Han after the Xin interregnum; 755, the mid-Tang; and 1550, the later Ming.
Finally, the propensity to organize China's past according to the rise and fall of dynastic regimes invites treatment of the PRC as the latest in the long succession of dynastic regimes. Such treatment has been irresistible in public discourse about that "did not satisfy the Chinese people's moral sense," rapid population growth, and "isolation of the court." Each element in this list may be criticized not only from the perspective of whether they accurately apply to trends in the PRC but also with respect to whether they actually were "prominent in the fall of dynasties in the past." On the former count, for example, succession struggles were ironically a far more destabilizing feature of the early decades of the PRC, under Mao, than they have been since Deng Xiaoping On the latter count, Terrill stipulates the following with regard to military defeats as a symptom of dynastic decline in the past:
Early in a dynasty, military victories were numerous. Later, vigor lacked, the cost of campaigns led to excessive tax on farmers, and wars were lost. The Han Dynasty lost battles to the Xiongnu, the Song met defeat at the hands of the Jin, the Qing were beaten by Britain in the Opium War three-quarters way through the dynasty. In the same vein, the contrast between the roles of the political elite in each state is stark. In the PRC's "revolutionary" phase down to 1978, CCP cadres served the twin purposes of social transformation-"waging class struggle" to create achieve egalitarian social goals-and economic modernization. For these purposes, the institutional system and scope of cadre activism penetrated to the very foundations of Chinese society, far beyond anything dreamed of in imperial times. Since 1978, when the PRC entered its "post-revolutionary" phase with the 11 th Central Committee's Third Plenum, the former goal of social transformation has been discarded, or perhaps postponed indefinitely pending achievement of the latter goal of development. In step with this, a "zone of indifference," to borrow Tsou Tang's apt term, has emerged in state-society relations.
But there remains no doubt about the ability of the state to reach into basic levels of capacity to do so. In short, the PRC has capacities of social penetration, mobilization, and integration far beyond anything imaginable in the late imperial era.
The imperial state shared neither of the CCP regime's goals. As scholarship by several scholars has shown since Zhang Zhongli's path-breaking work in the 1960s, the late imperial state was instead dedicated, in principle at least, to Confucian notions of "benevolent minimalist" governance. In late imperial times, the reach of the state was short and growing shorter as China under the Qing entered the nineteenth century. Faced with the alternative of expanding the imperial bureaucracy to keep pace with accelerating economic, demographic and social change, the imperial state opted instead to rely on minimalist mechanisms of gentry brokerage to govern an increasingly diverse and complex local society. The symbiotic balance between the prerogatives of the imperial state and the gentry-who played dual roles politically, both facilitating imperial governance in local society but also buffering it-began to tip decisively in the latter's favor.
In sum, insistence on the purported parallels between patterns of rule in the imperial era and in the communist period is simplistic and misleads fundamentally. And it obscures the critical discontinuities in politics that ought to inform an accurate understanding of the communist political order and its likely evolution.
HISTORICAL TRUTH #3: China's Foreign Relations Outlook
Miller : …the vehemence of Peking's denunciations of the two outside worlds that now encircle the embattled People's Middle Kingdom (Jen-min Chung-kuo) seems more than "ideological" in the usual sense of the term. Such impassioned scorn, such assertive righteousness, also echo the dynastic founders of ages past.
Noting that Beijing's strident nationalism amounted to "sinocentrism in modern dress," he concluded that "Peking's intractable mood comes out of China's history, not just Lenin's book." As early as Qinshihuang, there existed a Chinese foreign policy doctrine using both Legalism and Confucianism. After maximizing domestic power, the emperor looked abroad, to ward off foes and procure good horses for antinomad wars. Into this framework it is possible to fit much of the PRC's mercantilism, insistence on independence, bureaucratic caution, and obsession with the unity and security of China's territory.
And further:
Defining traits of Chinese foreign policy include: Difficulty in practicing give and take with other nations; open compromise occurs but it comes hard. Small interest in international solutions to problems; a preference for warding them off. Capability of caving in-the other side of the coin from high arrogance-when stonewalling proves counterproductive. Wariness of "enemies," against which the Chinese jia, as a vast household, must do battle. All of these traits stem from the hierarchical, Us-and-Them nature of the Chinese dynastic state.
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Another example of the use of such parallels comes from a well-reviewed and in most respects solid textbook on contemporary China's foreign relations by two political scientists, who offer a summary of China's traditional foreign policy outlook and practices that is breathtaking in its generality:
Except for seven maritime voyages of exploration between 1405 and 1433, in which Chinese ships sailed as far as the Middle East and Africa, China did not seek information about the outside world. It neither fought external wars no searched for external markets, and foreigners who came to China were welcome so long as they accepted the superiority of Chinese civilization. 14 From a historian's perspective, there are so many problems with this summary that it is hard to know where to start. But perhaps the following tally of objections may suggest the scale involved:
• Traditional China practiced isolationism? This notion ought to seem patently nonsensical at the outset, given China's geographical location as a huge empire sharing continental frontiers with Inner, Northeast, and Southeast Asia. No
Chinese regime attempted to wall itself off from its neighbors because it was a practical impossibility. Instead, Chinese regimes of necessity practiced activist policies toward their neighbors and, as in the case of the "cosmopolitan" Tang, regions beyond.
• Invading peoples were quickly sinicized? This would be a difficult case to make with respect to the fortunes of the Northern Wei Emperor Xiaowen's reforms in the 490s, for example, and even harder to make with respect to the Mongol regime, which did not get around to restoring the examination system until 1313, Asia and points beyond that developed from the Tang foward. In the latter regard, an unfortunate consequence of the attention that the spectacular fifteenth century voyages of the Ming eunuch Zheng He has garnered is that, ironically, it has left the impression that China has no tradition of maritime commerce. One wonders in that instance where early Ming shipbuilding expertise came from.
• Chinese did not fight foreign wars? The authors would do well to study the military history of the Song, which maintained an army of, by some estimates, of a million professional soldiers and which devoted some 80 percent of the imperial treasury to military expenditures. The historical reality is that Chinese regimes fought wars almost constantly across the span of the imperial era and before.
• The Hegemon is deeply embedded in China's national dreamwork, intrinsic to its national identity, and profoundly implicated in its sense of national destiny. An unwillingness to concede dominance to any foreign power is deeply rooted in China's imperial past as the dominant power of Asia and in the ongoing certainty of the Chinese that they are culturally superior to other peoples.
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Depending on how one defines a "hegemon," there is some validity to this truth.
In cultural terms, China was the cultural center of East Asia for much of the time since great Tang fluorescence. Beginning in that era, Chinese became the written language of official correspondence and elite discourse in Taika Although it has long been argued that the Manchus were thoroughly assimilated into Chinese ways and it is true that the Europeans arriving after the Manchu conquest not far off; it is the time for the lord of Xia," meaning that the times of a preceding era offer the rulers of the present era lessons to be drawn in the conduct of government. In the PRC, of course, historical materialism promised scientific methods of analyzing the universal laws of history that, in the hands of a vanguard leadership, enabled policies that would aid the progress of humanity.
Nevertheless, the relationship between history and politics is not in fact linear, nor does it act solely in one direction. It is a commonplace in communist countries the past changes constantly to adjust to shifts in the political present. A probably apocryphal but no less true account of a Soviet academic conference on historiography during the Khrushchev thaw depicts one party historian rising to declare, "Comrades! The present situation is excellent; the future is bright; it's just the past we're uncertain about." In the PRC, where Mao Zedong's watchword that "the past must serve the present" (古为今用) prevailed, the shape of the Chinese past has been repeatedly recast in step with the twists and turns of contemporary ideology and politics. Zeng Guofan, the self-strengthening leader of the Hunan Army, has been both a representative of the landlord class who the contemporary period, a leader whose great achievements were offset by tragic mistakes.
In the United States, where the pursuit of objective knowledge of the past and the subjective priorities of politics in the present are supposedly separate realms, the past no less serves the political present. However much history may inform the judgments of policy-makers, it is also true that politics shapes the history that historians create. This has been particularly true with respect to the study of China in the United States.
The long prevailing American narrative of "modern Chinese history" has been the story of the Chinese revolution. Produced by the first two generations of postwar American China scholars, the vast majority of "modern China" historiography sought directly or indirectly to explain why communism succeeded in China, of all places, and to assess the degree of Western responsibility for it.
Two key dates structured this narrative: 1840, marking the Opium War, after which China had to respond to the stimulus of the West; and 1949, marking the communist victory. Before 1840, Chinese history unfolded within China's "great tradition"; after that date, China was forced to change and adapt to pressures outside that tradition. The Opium War demonstrated the inadequacies of China's traditions for the modern world, and so to survive, China would have to reject its traditions. That is to say, China's survival required a revolutionary response. China's "modern history" is therefore the story of the 1949 revolution as the outcome of this long struggle. But why has this narrative persisted in public discourse about China today, long after historians' views about China have evolved? As argued above, it is not that the changes in historians' views have been small. They have been revolutionary:
• First, the historiography of late imperial and modern China in the last 20 years has taken an increasingly evolutionary, society-centered turn that has significantly modified, severely altered, and in some respects completely overturned foundational judgments of the older state-centered historiography of revolution.
On such questions as the reach of the late imperial state into society, the role of cities and commerce in the Ming and Qing economy, the degree of social diversity and change, the domination of the gentry in local society, the monolithic hegemony of Confucian culture, and the power of the emperor in regime politics, the new historiography has inverted longstanding conclusions about state-society relations in late imperial times.
• Second, proceeding from William Skinner's mid-1960s analysis of regional market systems, the new historiography disaggregates China. Many historians no longer find it convenient or comfortable to speak in generalizations about "China," but rather focus on "macroregional" cores that possessed distinctive economies, dialects, and regional and local cultures. In the opposite direction, past generalizations about "China" now appear not to have taken sufficient • Third, historiography of imperial and modern China is no longer as sinocentric as it once seemed. Writings by Wills, Hevia, Atwell, and others have shown that late imperial China's interactions with other societies were far more complex and diverse than as portrayed in the earlier portrait of traditional China an isolationist realm whose foreign interactions were conducted primarily through the tribute system. In addition, the old argument about the merits of "sinology," area studies, and the traditional Western social science and humanities disciplines has given way to (or perhaps fostered) comparative approaches that unite the models of historical change in the West with an apprehension of the unique and indigenous patterns and trends of a more "China-centered" approach, and an appreciation of 20 Even the contemporary Chinese term for what Westerners have called China--"Zhongguo"-and which they commonly take to mean "the Middle Kingdom" is modern (19th century) neologism, as a cursory survey of the semantic history of the term in the OED-like Hanyu Dacidian and Morohashi's Dai Kanwa Jiten suggests. The term "zhongguo" dates at least back to the Eastern Zhou era, but among several meanings, it then signified the "central states" of the Yellow River plain in the Zhou ruling coalition, not the "middle kingdom." It appears to have retained that sense down through the early Qing. The earliest cited usage of the term to signify "China" is by Lin the particular skills that traditional sinology brought to bear together with a broader effort to set China in world history.
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• Fourth, all of these trends have in combination undermined the chronological propensity to generalize broadly about "traditional" China versus "modern" and "contemporary" China. As discussed above, the previous historiography invited an impression of imperial China as one long succession of repetitive dynastic cycles, limited change within tradition, and perhaps ultimate stagnation. The assertion of parallels and continuities between past and contemporary China rested on bold generalizations across 2,000 years of imperial history, extracting seemingly enduring truths for comparison with a few decades of the PRC present, and so abetted this impression. Later historiography, in contrast, is producing a finer-grained sense of dynamism and change that challenges the older periodization of the imperial past, tracing out long spans of demographic, economic, and social trends that transcend the political boundaries provided by the rise and fall of dynastic houses. The periodization proposed above on pages 7-8 builds on some of these.
Given the scope of change in American historiography on traditional China, therefore, the remarkable thing is how little it has affected public discourse on China or, for that matter, academic analysis of China after 1949. There may be several reasons for 21 On the merits of sinology versus the traditional Western academic disciplines, see the debate in the Journal of Asian Studies, Vol.23 No.4 (August 1964, 505-538 and Vol.24 No.1 (November 1964, 109-114 boundary, while those engrossed in analyzing contemporary China seem largely unaware how radically the historical experience they sometime generalize from has been revised.
Historians rarely write for popular audiences and apply their research insights to contemporary issues. Political scientists do frequently write trade books for broader audiences, but many continue to draw on the older narrative of China's past that they may have studied briefly in "rice paddies" surveys that they took while embarking on the quest for universal laws of human political behavior during undergraduate and graduate studies.
The ideas and perspectives of neither historians nor political scientists as academics have any perceptible impact on policy-making. Both disciplines remain medieval guild-like communities whose respective scholarly agenda and discourse are driven by internal concerns of tenure, status within the community, and making In the 1979 and 1983 enlarged fourth editions-written as Deng Xiaoping's reform coalition was consolidating power--this passage from the 1971 edition was dropped.
Instead, the following continuity was added:
Meanwhile the positive force in the rise of the People's Republic was not simply the one man, Mao, whom we use to symbolize the event, but rather the devotion and organizing capacity of a whole generation of patriots who served mainly in the Chinese Communist Party. Their work, snowballing from 1921 to 1949 and into the 1970s, has been a tremendous feat of organization. Only the inheritors of China's political traditions, one may argue, could have done it. Foreign models and foreign activities in China, whether Japanese, Western, or Soviet, could serve only as stimuli, not substance. To say that the new order under the PRC is the latest phase of China's response to the outside world would omit the heart of the matter, which is the Chinese people's great mass, inertial momentum, and native genius for creating their own culture.
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Because of the fungible quality of Chinese "tradition," it may be that themes drawn from the past become reusable in what are perceived to be comparable trends with respect to China. Many of the longstanding parallels between China's past and present were drawn in an effort to help explain a China that appeared truculent, bellicose, and threatening. It may be, therefore, that these parallels and themes have sustained relevance because, for some Americans at least, China's rise today seems threatening.
If that is true, perhaps American use of China's past to elucidate its present and project its future might benefit from a healthy dose of self-reflection and self-knowledge.
In that regard, perhaps Chinese history may indeed serve as a mirror, providing us with a means of reflection on our own perceptions, emotions, and motives. But a number of points of departure suggest themselves. First, rather than searching for long parallels and enduring continuities, an alternative approach might underscore the evolutionary and revolutionary discontinuities between China's past foreign relations patterns and its contemporary and probable future outlook. It would seek to account for these discontinuities in terms of the sweeping changes in state capacity, social evolution, international context, and the successive revolutions in warfare over the past 500 years.
Such a narrative would be linear-not cyclical-and dynamic--though not inherently progressive. Second, it would disaggregate "China" geographically and temporally, being sensitive to the modern propensity to retroject modern concepts of sovereignty, nationality, territoriality, and identity into eras for which there was yet no footing for them. Finally, it would locate "China" in its broader regional and even global context in and so raised the criteria of effective state capacity. These included the changes in weaponry, tactics, and army size after the second half of the 16th century, the conduct of war en masse in the Napoleonic era, the development of breech-loading rifles and steamships in the mid-19th century, the use of rail transport and telegraphic communications in the 1870s, the use of tanks, aircraft, submarines, and chemical weapons in World War I, and the nuclear revolution in World War II.
Although both of these literatures specifically address Europe, taken together they offer a broader framework for assessing the evolution of the Chinese state in its broader international setting. This is emphatically not to say that China's experience need be judged according to the degree it conformed or deviated from the trajectories of European to organize a narrative of China's "early modern" and then "modern" history. The date 1550 marks inception of several roughly coincident transitions:
• The mid-16th century witnessed the beginning (or resumption) of China's economic revolution in agricultural productivity and commerce, which in turn stimulated the demographic explosion that raised China's population by a factor of five over the following three centuries.
• The mid-16th century also marked the advent of the European powers to East Asia, • The end of the 16th century also saw the consolidation of Tokugawa rule in Japan, providing the setting for Japan's early modern evolution over the following two and a half centuries.
• By the end of the 16th century, following the "time of troubles," tsarist Russia began its eastward expansion across Siberia, inaugurating a complex Central Asian politics of coalition-building, balance of power, and diplomatic manipulation with China and among various Mongol tribes and federations.
• The mid-16th century marked the beginning of the emergence of the early modern European state system consolidated at Westphalia in 1648, as well as the first of the military revolutions that shaped the nature of these states and their capacity to project power.
All of these events and trends inaugurated patterns of interaction that inaugurated the "modern" era and that remain with us today. Taken together, they suggest that China's "early modern" and modern history must be written from multiple levels, incorporating global, trans-Asian, national, and local perspectives. Second, modern state-building began very late in China, at the beginning of the 20th century. Successive episodes of state-building after the 1901 reforms aimed at creating increasing higher degrees of centralization, extraction of resources from society, capacity for coercion, and penetration into society radically different from the capacities of the late imperial state over the previous 450 years. In these critical respects, the Republican, Nationalist, and PRC regimes share far more in common than any of them do with the late imperial state.
Finally, and perhaps most germane, such a narrative may help bring several elements of contemporary China and its foreign policy outlook in sharper focus than has been offered by the longstanding effort to drawn parallels and purported continuities from the Chinese past. These may include a surer grasp of the orientation, preoccupations and 
